Prof. Dr. Eshref Ymeri: Fascist Russia will lose the war with Ukraine

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Prof. Dr. Eshref Ymeri: Fascist Russia will lose the war with Ukraine

During the four years (24 February 2022 – 24 February 2026) in Ukraine, according to the website “Fakti”, 1,262,340 Russian soldiers and officers have been killed.

Since the beginning of the large-scale attack by the Russian army against Ukraine exactly four years ago (24 February 2022), the Kremlin had anticipated a quick victory, based on numerical superiority, military power, and considerable weapons reserves. However, after four years of military operations, it has become clear that Moscow’s strategy is not bringing the desired results. A war aimed at exhausting the opponent requires not only human reserves, but also economic stability, innovative potential, and a high adaptive spirit of the army—areas in which Russia cannot compare with Ukraine and its allies. Let us focus on the fundamental reasons why Russia cannot win the war against Ukraine.

First, the lack of Russia’s economic stability. The war has proven to be a heavy burden on the Russian economy. About 40% of the budget is spent on military needs, which negatively affects other areas of the country’s life. High loan interest rates, exceeding 20%, make full financing of the economy impossible, while the drop in oil prices, Western sanctions, and Ukraine’s strikes on oil and gas infrastructure cause Moscow to lose vital revenues. Under conditions of isolation, Russia is increasingly struggling to import modern technologies, which slows down weapons production.

Second, the weakness of the Russian army and the military-industrial complex. Despite mobilization and increased production of equipment, Russia cannot compensate for losses on the battlefield. The Russian military-industrial complex was not designed to sustain a long, high-intensity war. The deficit of high-tech weaponry and dependence on imported components have reduced the quality of combat equipment. At the same time, the numerical size of the Russian army reached its peak in 2024 (650,000 soldiers and officers), but then began to decline. Losses continue to rise: if in December 2022 losses reached 500 killed per day, in December 2024 they increased to 1,500. In 2025 alone, Russia suffered 430,000 killed and wounded, almost twice as many as in 2023.

Third, Ukraine’s technological successes. Ukraine relied on innovation, and this strategy is proving effective. The mass production of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) has given the Ukrainian army an advantage and radically changed military tactics. In 2024, Ukraine produced 1.2 million drones, and by the end of 2025 increased production by another 4 million. Drones serve Ukraine as a main striking force, replacing artillery, and now account for more than 70% of Russian troop losses. Their mobility and high effectiveness allow the Ukrainian army to strike not only advanced Russian positions but also deep rear areas, destroying logistics and critical infrastructure.

Fourth, Ukraine’s successful defense. Russia’s strategy of strikes against energy and industrial facilities is not achieving the desired effect. Ukrainian air defense withstands attacks, protecting key facilities and reducing civilian casualties. At the same time, Ukraine successfully uses its drones to strike Russian military targets and oil and gas infrastructure, undermining the opponent’s economy.

Fifth, the superiority of Western reserves. In addition to its own efforts, Ukraine receives significant assistance from the United States of America and the European Union. Around 30% of military supplies are provided by the United States, 30% by the European Union, while 40% of armaments Ukraine produces itself. European industry has the capacity to produce key weapon components, including drone engines and high-precision missiles. Comparing the gross domestic product of Russia and Western countries reveals a significant imbalance: the European Union’s GDP is ten times larger than Russia’s, and when including the United Kingdom and Norway, the imbalance becomes even greater. Under these conditions, Moscow cannot hope for victory in a long war of attrition.

Rutte: Moscow’s army is not faster than a garden snail- Portal “Bota Sot” 13 February 2026

 Russia’s major offensive in Ukraine has been ongoing for four years—with limited success, according to NATO chief Rutte. The Dutchman compares the pace of Kremlin troops to that of a garden snail. He also emphasizes the heavy losses suffered by Putin’s army.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte compared Russia’s pace of advancement in Ukraine to that of a garden snail. “This so-called Russian bear (a symbol of Russian power) does not exist,” he said at the Munich Security Conference. “In the end, it does not move faster than a garden snail.”

Rutte also pointed to the heavy losses suffered by Russian armed forces in the war of aggression. In December alone, 35,000 Russian soldiers were killed, and in January, 30,000. “These are the facts. This is why we must keep Ukraine strong, because we see that it is making the best use of our support,” he said. He aims to make clear at the Munich Security Conference that the Russians are not winning, as some believe.

Earlier this week, a senior NATO official estimated that the number of Russian soldiers killed or wounded last year was around 400,000. This brings the total number of losses to approximately 1.3 million, including about 350,000 Russian soldiers killed. “Moscow is sacrificing more men and women than in any European conflict since the Second World War,” he said.

However, the NATO official described the situation for Ukrainian armed forces as “still difficult.” Russian forces continued to make gradual territorial advances along several sections of the front. In addition to Russia’s favorable balance of power, its limited successes last month were likely also due to poor weather, which reduced the effectiveness of Ukrainian interceptor drones.

“Russian troops are exerting pressure on Ukrainian forces through the massive use of drones and artillery, employing tactics of attrition,” the official said. Nevertheless, their operational effectiveness is limited by personnel quality, logistical constraints, and adjustments made by opposing forces. Therefore, a complete collapse of Ukrainian defense this year remains quite unlikely, despite limited reserves and thin defensive lines.

But there is another reason, no less important, for the failure of Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine. It concerns the Soviet legacy of combat capabilities among the command cadre of the Russian army on the Ukrainian front. The following material best highlights that this legacy, dating back to the Second World War, is alarming. Let us follow the material below:

10 idiot marshals who cost millions of soldiers their lives (Declassified archives)

YouTube channel “cccp за ширмой истории” (The Soviet Union Behind the Curtain of History) 06 December 2025

“Stop! Do not leave! What you are about to learn will overturn everything you have been taught for 70 years. Marshals of the Soviet Union, golden hero stars on pedestals, bronze monuments in city squares, names on memorial plaques in schools and streets, geniuses of military art, saviors of the fatherland, invincible strategists. The whole country bowed before them, history books told of their heroism, cinema glorified their wisdom. But declassified archives, published interrogation protocols, and recently published memoirs of generals forced to remain silent have revealed a monstrous truth. Ten marshals of the Soviet Union displayed such shortsightedness that their decisions cost not thousands but millions of soldiers their lives…”

But declassified archives, published interrogation protocols, and finally the memoirs of generals who had been forced into silence have revealed a monstrous truth. Ten marshals of the Soviet Union stood out for such staggering shortsightedness that their decisions cost not thousands, but millions of soldiers their lives. Because of their stubbornness, they sentenced the army to death; they lost battles that any graduate of a military academy could have won. They dragged the country into an abyss of blood because of their incompetence, fear, and elementary stupidity.

The system concealed this for seventy years, because to admit publicly the foolishness of the marshals would have meant admitting that the entire Soviet military machine had been built upon a foundation of lies. Today you will learn the names of ten generals, ten tragedies, ten catastrophes moments when the golden stars on their epaulettes masked the emptiness in their heads. And the last marshal on this list will astonish you to the depths of your soul. He was hailed as the greatest strategist of the twentieth century. Four hundred statues were erected to him; his bronze face looks down at you from Red Square. Yet the documents prove that he was a thick-headed butcher who achieved victories not through intellect but through numbers, burying the enemy under mountains of Soviet soldiers’ corpses.

Watch until the end, because the factual data about this general will change your perception of the Great Patriotic War. Let us begin.

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1. Kliment Voroshilov

People’s Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union from 1925 to 1940. For fifteen years this man was responsible for the combat readiness of the Red Army. His portrait hung in every military branch of the country. The KV tank bore his initials; the city of Luhansk was renamed after him in 1935; songs were dedicated to him as an unyielding commander. Stalin called him his loyal comrade-in-arms.

But here is what declassified documents say: “Protocol No. 8417/k, dated March 23, 1940. Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Agenda: discussion of the failure of the Finnish campaign.” The transcript preserves Stalin’s words:

‘Voroshilov understands nothing about modern warfare—absolutely nothing.’

The war with Finland began on November 30, 1939. The Red Army had 1.2 million soldiers, 3,000 tanks, and 2,000 aircraft when it attacked Finland. The Finnish army had 270,000 soldiers, 30 tanks, and 114 aircraft. The balance of forces was clearly in the Red Army’s favor. Any clear-minded commander could have secured victory within two weeks.

Instead, Voroshilov dragged the war on for four months, 105 days of which were sheer horror. Soviet soldiers froze in forests at minus 40°C because they had not been supplied with winter clothing. Voroshilov had assumed the war would end before the severe cold began. Tanks became stuck in the snow because no one had considered adapting military equipment for winter conditions. Infantry continued frontal assaults against Finnish fortifications; hundreds died because Voroshilov lacked even a basic understanding of how to attack fortified positions.

Writer and soldier Viktor Astafyev later described one episode: on December 27, 1939, an assault on Height 65 near Lake Loppajarvi. A battalion of 800 men attacked without reconnaissance, artillery preparation, or tank support—simply a frontal charge into machine-gun fire. Only 112 returned. The height was not taken.

During the Finnish campaign, the Red Army lost 126,875 killed and 264,000 wounded or frozen. This figure exceeded the population of Finland at that time. A small country resisted a vast army because that army was commanded by an incompetent.

From Berlin, Hitler watched closely. Seeing Soviet tanks burning and infantry retreating, he concluded that the Soviet Union was a colossus with feet of clay: weak army, brainless command, easily crushed within a month. Voroshilov’s incompetence helped convince Germany to attack.

On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began. Voroshilov was appointed commander of the Northwestern Front, including Leningrad. Within two months he lost Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and half of the Leningrad region. The Germans encircled Leningrad. The blockade lasted 872 days—an inferno partly born of his failure to organize defense.

On September 13, 1941, Stalin summoned him to Moscow. The conversation was brief: “You failed at the front. Leave.” He was dismissed. By military law he should have faced court-martial and execution, but Stalin spared his old friend and reassigned him far from the front.

Voroshilov died on December 2, 1969, at age 88, in his own bed, surrounded by honors and medals. A man whose blunders cost perhaps 200,000 lives ended his days as a celebrated hero. Yet there was another marshal even more obstinate.

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2. Semyon Budyonny

Commander of the First Cavalry Army, legend of the Civil War (1918–1922), famous for his mustache and saber. Songs were written about him; statues were erected in his honor during his lifetime. He symbolized revolutionary cavalry valor.

But there was a catastrophic flaw: Budyonny remained mentally stuck in 1918. To him, war was forever reduced to saber-wielding cavalry charges. Tanks, aircraft, modern maneuver warfare—these he could not grasp.

At a May 12, 1939 military council meeting discussing mechanization, he reportedly declared:

“A tank is a tank, but a horse is a horse. A well-organized cavalry charge can destroy any tank. Engines break down; a horse will carry you to the end.”

No one dared argue. He insisted cavalry was the army’s main striking force and demanded more cavalry divisions instead of tanks. When German blitzkrieg tactics were explained—armored wedges, flanking maneuvers, encirclement—he dismissed them as nonsense, claiming victory depended on fighting spirit, not technology.

Before the war, the Red Army had 32 cavalry divisions while Germany built armored divisions.

On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked. Budyonny was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front—Ukraine, a massive front with millions of soldiers. Within two months he presided over disaster. German panzer groups under Guderian and Kleist bypassed, encircled, and annihilated his forces.

Budyonny ordered: hold to the death, no retreat, frontal assault. Entire formations were trapped and destroyed.

The encirclement of Kyiv became one of the worst catastrophes of the war. Between August 21 and September 26, 1941, four Soviet armies—665,000 soldiers—were encircled near Kyiv. Budyonny forbade withdrawal, believing his forces would break out with cavalry spirit.

Lieutenant General Mikhail Kirponos telegraphed desperately:

“The enemy is closing the ring. Immediate withdrawal is required, otherwise catastrophe is inevitable.”

Kirponos kept sending telegrams:

“The enemy is closing the encirclement. Immediate withdrawal of the troops is required, otherwise catastrophe is inevitable.”

But permission never came in time. The order from above was to hold positions. Budyonny believed that steadfastness and frontal resistance would reverse the situation. He underestimated the speed and flexibility of German armored tactics. By the time authorization for retreat was finally discussed, it was too late. The encirclement had sealed shut.

On September 20, 1941, General Kirponos was killed while attempting to break out. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers were captured. The scale of the disaster shocked even the German command. It was one of the largest encirclements in military history.

Budyonny was removed from frontline command shortly afterward. Yet he was not prosecuted. He was not publicly disgraced. Like others of his rank, he was reassigned, shielded by the system he had helped shape. The official narrative preserved his legend. The cavalry hero remained a symbol, while the catastrophe was absorbed into silence.

He lived a long life, dying in 1973, decorated and honored. The statues remained. The songs remained. The myth remained.

But the documents tell another story: a commander unable to adapt to modern warfare, whose outdated thinking contributed to enormous losses. The tragedy was not merely personal incompetence—it was systemic rigidity, where loyalty outweighed ability, and myth overshadowed reality.

And these were only two names.

There were more—each tied to decisions that altered the fate of millions. Each elevated to near-mythic stature, their portraits framed in gold, their chests heavy with medals. Yet beneath the decorations lay fear of responsibility, resistance to innovation, and obedience to a system that punished dissent more harshly than failure.

The final marshal on the list—the one celebrated as the greatest strategist of the twentieth century—stands at the center of the greatest paradox. His image towers in bronze; his name fills textbooks; his victories are commemorated annually. And yet archival materials suggest that many of those victories were achieved at a staggering human cost, through relentless attrition rather than operational brilliance.

The narrative of the Great Patriotic War has long been one of heroism, sacrifice, and triumph. And indeed, the sacrifice was real—immeasurable in scale. But the question raised by the archives is different: how much of that sacrifice was unavoidable, and how much was the result of flawed leadership concealed by propaganda?

History is rarely as simple as monuments suggest. Bronze does not record hesitation. Marble does not confess error. Pedestals do not speak of miscalculation.

But paper does.

And once the archives are opened, once transcripts are read, once private memoirs surface, the image changes. Not entirely—never entirely—but enough to disturb certainty.

The golden stars still gleam in museums. The statues still stand in squares. Yet behind them now flickers another image: one of human limitation magnified by absolute power.

And that is perhaps the most unsettling revelation of all.